How the iPhone Widens the US Trade Deficit with China:the Case of the iPhone X by XING Yuqing
  
 
 
GRIPS Discussion Paper 19-21 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
How the iPhone Widens the US Trade Deficit with China:the Case of the 
iPhone X 
 
 
 
 
 
Yuqing Xing  
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo, Japan 106-8677 
1 
 
How the iPhone Widens the US Trade Deficit with China: the Case of the 
iPhone X 
 
Yuqing Xing 
 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
Tokyo, Japan 
 
Email: yuqing_xing@grips.ac.jp 
 
Abstract 
Through an examination of the case of the iPhone X, this paper demonstrates that Chinese 
companies involved in production of the iPhone X have moved up the value chain. According 
to the bill of materials, those companies contributed 25% of the value added of the iPhone X. 
About 45% of the value added of the iPhone X originated from Japan, Korean and other 
economies. The iPhone trade remains a significant element of the statistics distortion of the 
Sino-US bilateral trade imbalance. In terms of gross value, the import of one iPhone X results 
in a $332.75 trade deficit for the US; measured in terms of value added, the deficit is a mere 
$104. Depreciation of the yuan has very limited power to counterbalance the tariffs imposed 
by the Trump administration because foreign value added embedded in Chinese exports is 33.9% 
on average. Simulation results show that to counterbalance a 25% tariff, the yuan would have 
to depreciate by 43.3% against the US dollar on average; and to fully compensate for a 25% 
tariff burden on the iPhone X, a 400% depreciation of the yuan would be necessary. Hedging 
the risk of the punitive US tariffs by depreciation of the yuan is mission impossible.  
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1.  Introduction  
In 2010, my research assistant Neal Detert and I published “How the iPhone widens the US 
trade deficit with China” (Xing and Detert, 2010). Based on the analysis of the Chinese export 
in the iPhone 3G to the US, the paper arrived at three conclusions. First, conventional trade 
statistics significantly exaggerated the US trade deficit with China, and value added, rather than 
gross value of exports, should be used to assess the bilateral trade balance between the US and 
China in the age of global value chains (GVC). Second, foreign value added embedded in the 
iPhone export substantially weakened the impact of exchange rates on the Sino-US bilateral 
trade balance, so that even a 50% yuan appreciation would have little impact on China’s iPhone 
exports to the US, because foreign value added counted for 96.4% of the total production cost 
of the iPhone 3G.  Finally, the paper concluded that profit maximization was Apple’s 
motivation for having the iPhone assembled in China.   
Since the 2007 release of the first generation iPhone, China has been the exclusive base for 
assembly of the iPhone. Assembly was the least value added task in the value chain of the 
iPhone; China received a mere $6.5 for assembling a ready-to-use iPhone 3G. After more than 
a decade, the iPhone has evolved into a luxury high-tech gadget, with not only the most 
advanced technologies but also a $1,000 price tag. Have the Chinese firms involved in the 
production of the iPhone moved up the ladder of the value chain? Do they perform more 
sophisticated tasks and capture more of the value added of the latest iPhone models?  Does the 
iPhone remain a major source of the distortion of statistics on the bilateral trade imbalance 
between China and the US? To answer these questions, this paper takes the iPhone X as a case 
for replication of the analysis of the 2010 paper.  
Since March 2018 the US has been waging a trade war with China. To achieve fair and 
reciprocal trade, the Trump administration has imposed a punitive 25% tariff on $250 billion 
worth of Chinese goods. It will levy a 15% tariff on an additional $300 billion in Chinese goods, 
effective December 2019 (Reuters, 2019). Since the start of the trade war, the Chinese yuan 
has been following a depreciation trend against the US dollar. The yuan–dollar exchange rate 
rose from 6.2 yuan/dollar to 7.10 yuan/dollar during the period of March 2018 to October 2019, 
a 14.5% nominal depreciation.  Conventional wisdom fuels speculation that the Chinese 
government deliberately utilized the yuan’s depreciation to counterbalance the punitive US 
tariffs. A research note by the Bank of America voiced expectation that a 10% depreciation of 
the yuan could completely cancel the impact of a 10% tariff (Tan, 2019). Alleging that the 
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Chinese government used depreciation as a trade war weapon, the Trump administration 
immediately designated China a “currency manipulator” after the yuan–dollar rate broke the 
7.0 yuan/dollar psychological level (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2019).  
Can yuan depreciation really offset the negative impact of the punitive tariffs? The 2010 paper 
argues that, because of the foreign value added embedded in the iPhone 3G, appreciation of 
the yuan would have little impact on iPhone exports to the US. The same logics applies to the 
depreciation of the yuan. Because of foreign value added, the depreciation of the yuan would 
have a very limited effect in counterbalancing the burden of the 25% tariff imposed on Apple 
products assembled in China. Section 4 of this paper provides a theoretical explanation of the 
impossibility of hedging the risk of the punitive tariffs by means of yuan depreciation, and 
presents the results of a simulation of the yuan depreciation required under a variety of 
scenarios, where tariffs and foreign value added are two exogenous variables. 
 
2.  Moving Up the iPhone Value Chain  
Grimes and Sun (2016) find that Chinese firms have played an increasingly important role in 
Apple’s value chains. In 2014, 14 of 198 companies in Apple’s supply chain were Chinese. A 
few of them supplied core components, e.g., displays and printed circuit boards. This suggests 
that Chinese firms have strengthened their presence in the value chains controlled by Apple. 
For an understanding of Chinese firms’ upward progress in the iPhone value chain, we examine 
the teardown data of the iPhone X to assess the involvement of Chinese firms in the production 
of the iPhone X, and estimate the value added captured by those firms.  The teardown data 
identifies 10 domestic Chinese companies participating in the value chain of the iPhone X. 
Their tasks go beyond simple assembly to include roles in relatively sophisticated segments.  
Sunwada, a leading Chinese battery maker, supplies the battery pack of the iPhone X. Sony 
batteries were used in the early iPhone models; Sunwada’s supplanting Sony as a battery pack 
supplier is a significant upgrading of Sunwada in the iPhone value chain.  Kersen Technology 
provides the iPhone’s stainless frame, and Lens Technology manufactures the glass back cover 
(a first with the iPhone X). Together the stainless frame and glass back cover cost $53, about 
13% of the total manufacturing cost of the iPhone X—more than 11 times the $4.5 assembly 
fee paid by Apple. In addition, Chinese companies Anjie Technology and Lushare Precision 
are involved in the manufacture of the iPhone X touch screen and 3D sensing module—critical 
technological components of the iPhone X. The former translates the user’s finger movements 
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into data that can be interpreted as commands, while the latter is a key element of the facial 
recognition system introduced in the iPhone X.  Chinese company Dongshan Precision joined 
the suppliers of Apple by acquiring American company M-Flex; it now supplies the printed 
circuit boards for the iPhone X for $15 per unit. Chinese companies Goertech, Shenzhen 
Sunway, Crystal-Optech and O-film provide functional parts: speakers, RF antennas, filters 
and camera modules, respectively. The involvement of those Chinese firms, though restricted 
to non-core technology segments of the iPhone X value chain, indicates that the Chinese mobile 
phone industry as a whole has moved to the upper rungs of the iPhone value chain ladder. Table 
1 lists those Chinese firms and their corresponding tasks in the value chain of the iPhone X.  
Despite the extensive involvement of Chinese firms in the iPhone chain, our analysis reveals 
that all core components embedded in the printed circuit board assembly (PCBA), including 
processor, DRAM, NAND, display and camera, are supplied by non-Chinese companies: 
Apple, Qualcomm, Broadcom, Samsung, Toshiba, Sony and others.   
Table 1 Tasks Performed by Chinese Firms for the iPhone 3G and iPhone X 
3G iPhone (2009) iPhone X (2018) 
 Assembly 
(Foxconn) 
 
Total value added $6.5, 
3.6% of the bill of 
materials.   
 Assembly (Foxconn); 
 Functional parts for touchscreen module (Anjie 
Technology); 
 Filter for 3D sensing module (Crystal Optech); 
 Coil module for wireless charging (Lushare 
Precision); 
 Printed circuit board (M-Flex); 
 Speakers (Goertek); 
 RF antenna (Shenzhen Sunway); 
 Battery pack (Sunwada); 
 Glass cover (Lens Technology); 
 Stainless frame (Kersen Technology); 
 Camera module (O-Filem)  
 
Total value added: $104, 25.4% of the bill of materials. 
 
Source: Xing and Detert (2010) and the teardown data provided by the author’s technical 
support team. 
According to the teardown data, the bill of materials of the iPhone X is $409.25, of which the 
Chinese firms jointly contribute $104, or about 25.4% of the total manufacturing cost. That 
means that every iPhone X sold in the global market generates $104 income for the Chinese 
economy. Compared with the iPhone 3G, where Chinese value added was only $6.5, or about 
3.6% of the total production cost, Chinese value added in the iPhone X is dramatically higher. 
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This implies significant upward movement by the Chinese firms along the iPhone value chain. 
The so-called “low value added trap” phenomenon is not present in the case of the Chinese 
firms participating the value chain of Apple.  
The dominance of the iPhone in the global market and its worldwide popularity have little to 
do with China’s comparative advantage; rather they are the result of Apple’s constant 
technology innovation and marketing activities. The constantly rising demand for the iPhone 
in the world market always translates automatically into demand for the services and periphery 
components supplied by the Chinese companies.  Apple’s global expansion always lifts China’s 
exports and its income. As the iPhone assembly base, China has benefited tremendously from 
the success of Apple. In 2018, Apple sold more than 217.72 million iPhones globally (Liu, 
2019), contributing roughly $22.6 billion value added to the Chinese economy. This is clear 
evidence that participation in GVCs can greatly enhance the economic growth and 
industrialization of developing countries.   
Figure 1: Chinese Value Added Embedded in the iPhone 3G and iPhone X 
 
Source: Xing and Detert (2010) and the author’s calculation 
A value chain consists of pre-production, production and post-production activities. For 
estimations of the share of domestic value added in a country’s exports and fair evaluations of 
its bilateral trade balances with trading partners, manufacturing cost of a product is the 
appropriate benchmark. On the other hand, for assessment of the value captured by Chinese 
firms in the entire iPhone X value chain, we should use retail price rather than production costs 
as a yardstick, since retail price proxies the total value added of the iPhone X. The retail price 
of the iPhone X torn down for this research is $1,000. Using the bill of materials, we calculate 
3.6%
1.3%
25.4%
10.4%
Manufacturing costs Retail Prices
iPhone 3G iPhone X
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that $590.75, about 60% of the retail price, is attributed to the value added by Apple’s retail 
service, brand and technology, and represents the gross profit margin of the iPhone X. 
Compared with the value added contributed  by Apple, the $104 value added contributed by 
the Chinese firms is much smaller, just 10.4% of the total value added of the iPhone X.  Figure 
1 illustrates the Chinese value added of the iPhone X compared with that of the iPhone 3G.  
The figure clearly shows that the Chinese value added of the iPhone X is significantly higher 
than that of the iPhone 3G in both measures, implying a significant upgrading of the Chinese 
firms along the value chain of the iPhone.  
 
3. The iPhone X: a Significant Source of the Bilateral Trade Imbalance 
 In 2018， US trade deficit with China in goods amounted $420 billion (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2019). The huge and persistent trade deficit triggered the on-going Sino-US trade war.  
However, the bilateral trade imbalance between the two countries has been significant 
exaggerated by current trade statistics, which are inconsistent with GVC based modern trade. 
To date, trade statistics are still compiled based on gross value of exports, implicitly assuming 
that all gross value is generated by the exporting nation. According to that principle, whenever 
China ships one iPhone X to the US, the current system of trade statistics calculates it as a 
$409.25 export to the US, not including transportation cost. The teardown data reveals that the 
total value of the parts imported from the US for assembly of the iPhone X is $76.5. Hence, 
importing one iPhone X from China generates a $332.75 ($409.25–$76.5) trade deficit for the 
US. That is the conventional approach to calculation of bilateral trade balance.   
Figure 2. US Trade Deficit with China for One Imported iPhone X ($) 
 
Source: the author’s estimation based on the teardown data provided by the author’s technical 
team. 
332.75
104
Gross Exports Value Added
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On the other hand, the teardown data shows that Korea, Japan and other countries are also 
involved in the production of the iPhone X, supplying more than 45% of the parts and 
components. In other words, the $332.75 consists of not only value added originating in China 
but also that contributed by Korea, Japan and other non-US countries. Using the exporting-
country-only figure to measure the trade balance surely exaggerates the US trade deficit with 
China. If measured in value added, the US deficit with China for the import of one iPhone X 
is only $104, less than one third of the figure based on gross value (figure 2). The difference 
between the two estimates is $228.75, implying that for every iPhone X imported, current trade 
statistics mistakenly add $228.75 to the US trade deficit with China.  It is important to 
emphasize that it is the Apple that paid the cost of the parts sourced from designated Apple 
suppliers in US, Japan, Korean and other non-China countries. There is no $409.25 income 
transfer from the US to China when the US imports an iPhone X from China. The actual income 
transfer is the $104 paid for the assembly services and parts supplied by the Chinese firms.  
Due to data constraints, we are unable to accurately assess the overall statistical distortion of 
the Sino-US trade imbalance associated with the iPhone trade in 2018. It is estimated that in 
2017 American consumers bought 42.2 million units of iPhones (Finder, 2019), all of them 
imported from China. Using that figure as a reference, we infer that the iPhone trade inflated 
US trade deficit with China in 2018 by $9.65 billion, about 2.3% of the deficit. Therefore, the 
iPhone remains a significant source of the statistics distortion on the Sino-US bilateral trade 
imbalance.  
The iPhone case convincingly demonstrates that conventional trade statistics significantly 
inflate China’s trade imbalance with the US. It is shown above that, for evaluation of the 
bilateral trade balance, value added is a better tool than gross value trade. However, the iPhone 
X is an extreme case and cannot be taken as a general proxy for Chinese exports to the US. 
Many economists employ international input-output tables, which disclose country origins of 
intermediates, in their estimations of the US-China trade deficit in value added. Koopman, 
Wang, and Wei (2014) demonstrate theoretically how the value added of gross exports of 
individual countries can be traced with input-output tables. Johnson and Noguera (2012) adopt 
the same approach and conclude that the 2004 US-China trade imbalance would be 30-40% 
smaller if it were measured in value added. The OECD and WTO construct a database of trade 
in value added (TiVA) for estimating value added in the gross exports of more than 60 countries 
(OECD and WTO, 2013). The University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, 
China, also compiles a database, UIBE-GVC Indexes, to measure various parameters related 
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to GVC participation and value added in trade. Here we employ UIBE-GVC Indexes data to 
calculate US overall trade deficit with China in value added and its deficit with China in the 
category of computers, electronics and opticals (the largest group of Chinese exports to the 
US). In 2015, US trade deficit with China, calculated as value added, was 56% of that 
calculated as gross value, and the trade deficit measured in value added for computers, 
electronics and opticals was 41% of that calculated as gross value (figure 3). Unambiguously, 
gross values of exports significantly exaggerate the US trade deficit with China. Conventional 
trade statistics are inconsistent with GVC based modern trade and substantially distort the 
actual bilateral trade balance between the US and China.   
 
Figure 3. US Trade Deficit with China in Value Added 
 (deficit in gross value =100) 
 
Source: the author’s calculation based on UIBE-GVC Indexes and the World Bank 
(2019) 
 
4. Hedging Trump’s Tariffs by Yuan Depreciation: Mission Impossible 
 
The above analysis reveals that foreign value added accounts for 75% of the production cost 
of the iPhone X. The significantly large share of foreign value added embedded in the iPhone 
X exposes the vulnerability of the iPhones assembled in China to the punitive tariffs, which 
will be likely levied by the Trump administration if the trade war escalates further. All parts 
made in US, Japan, Korea and other countries for assembling iPhones in China will be subject 
to the tariffs too, when a ready-to-use iPhone X is shipped to the US.  Even a substantial 
depreciation of the yuan cannot help Apple mitigate the burden of the tariffs. This explains 
why Apple has been so worried about the trade war.  
56
41
all goods (2015) computer, electronic and opticals (2014)
9 
 
When the Chinese yuan depreciates against the US dollar, only the $104 Chinese value added, 
representing the assembling fee and non-core components produced by the Chinese firms, will 
be affected. The rest of the iPhone X’s production cost, $305.25, the sum of all parts and 
components shipped from foreign countries to China for assembling the iPhone X, will remain 
constant and not be affected whatsoever. However, if President Trump decides to levy a 25% 
tariff on the iPhone X imported from China, the tax base will be $409.25, i.e. the sum of both 
Chinese and foreign value added.  In other words, the parts and components shipped to China 
from foreign countries, including the US, will be subject to the tariff.  
A 25% depreciation of the yuan can surely offset the burden associated with the 25% tariff 
imposed on the Chinese value added. However, the $76.3 tax burden resulting from the 25% 
tariff levied on the foreign value added $305.25, remains.  To offset the $76.3 tariff burden, 
the yuan would have to be depreciated much more than 25%. If not, Apple would either have 
to absorb it by lowering its profit margin, or pass it on to iPhone users. Given the $1,000 or 
higher price tags of iPhones, it is almost impossible to pass the burden to iPhone users. This 
explains Apple’s vulnerability to the tariffs. If President Trump orders a 25% levy on iPhones, 
moving the assembly task of the iPhones destined for the US market out of China must be 
Apple’s only choice. The analysis of the relationship between the tariff and the required level 
of yuan depreciation can be generalized for all Chinese exports to the US.   
Let TV denote the total value added of Chinese exports to the US. In terms of the US dollar, 
TV can be written as 
𝑇𝑉 =
𝐷𝑉𝐴
𝑒
+ 𝐹𝑉𝐴 (1), 
where DVA denotes the domestic value added measured in the yuan; FVA foreign value added 
in the US dollar; and e the exchange rate, i.e. the price of the dollar in the yuan. Let t be the 
tariff levied on Chinese goods by the US.  If the yuan depreciates to the level e* from e so that 
the tariff effect would be offset completely, e* should meet the following condition  
𝐷𝑉𝐴
𝑒
+ 𝐹𝑉𝐴 = (
𝐷𝑉𝐴
𝑒∗
+ 𝐹𝑉𝐴)(1 + 𝑡) (2). 
Equation (2) implies that the price of Chinese exports to the US with the tariff is same as that 
without after the depreciation of the yuan.  
Solving equation (2) yields 
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𝑒 ∗=
𝐷𝑉𝐴+𝐷𝑉𝐴∗𝑡
𝐷𝑉𝐴
𝑒
−𝐹𝑉𝐴∗𝑡
  (3) 
The required depreciation as a percentage is 
∝=
𝑒∗−𝑒
𝑒
× 100% = (
1+𝑡
1−𝑎∗𝑡
− 1) × 100% (4) 
where 𝑎 = 𝐹𝑉𝐴/(
𝐷𝑉𝐴
𝑒
), the ratio of foreign value added to domestic value added. 
Using equation (4), we simulate different scenarios of yuan depreciation. In each case, the tariff 
and foreign value added are given. We consider two different tariffs, 10% and 25%, used by 
the Trump administration. Foreign value added is assumed to range from zero to 75%. The 
simulation results are presented in figure 4.  
According to the simulation results, (1) the required yuan depreciation is higher than the 
corresponding tariff when foreign value added is greater than zero; (2) it rises rapidly as foreign 
value added increases; and (3) after foreign value added exceeds a certain threshold, the 
required yuan depreciation increases to an impossible level. Specifically, with a 10% tariff, 
11.2% depreciation of the yuan can counterbalance the tariff if foreign value added is 10%; if 
the foreign value added rises to 50%, a 22.2%  depreciation is needed; for exports with 75% 
foreign value added, the required depreciation is estimated at 57.1%, which is almost 
impossible according to the fundamentals of the Chinese economy. If the tariff levied on 
Chinese goods is raised to 25%, the required depreciation increases in all scenarios. The yuan 
would have to depreciate 28.6% in order to cancel the negative impact of the tariff if foreign 
value added is 10%; a 50% depreciation is necessary if foreign value added increases to 40%; 
and a 100% depreciation is required for Chinese exports with 60% of foreign value added. 
The depreciation rates required to compensate for a 25% tariff are generally too high to be 
realized. In other words, it is impossible for China to use the depreciation of the yuan to hedge 
the risk of such a tariff. When foreign value added is zero, the required depreciation is just 
equal to the corresponding tariffs, implying that currency depreciation can be used as a policy 
tool to cope with punitive tariffs under conventional clothe-for-wine trade, where foreign value 
added is zero in all nations’ exports.  
According to UIBE-GVE Indexes, on average Chinese exports to the US contain 33.9% of 
foreign value added; in computers, mobile phones and opticals, average foreign value added is 
estimated to be 54%; our analysis for the iPhone X indicates foreign value added of 75%. Using 
equation (4), it is straightforward to derive that  a 43.4% depreciation of the yuan is required 
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to completely offset the negative impact of a 25% punitive tariff on all Chinese exports to the 
US on average, while an unthinkable 400% depreciation of the yuan is necessary to eliminate 
the negative impact of the same tariff levied on the iPhone X. To offset completely the negative 
impact of a 25% tariff on computers, mobile phones and opticals, a 76.9% depreciation of the 
yuan is necessary.  Clearly, China cannot counterbalance a 25% punitive tariff by means of 
yuan depreciation without triggering economic turmoil.  
Figure 4. Yuan Depreciation Required Offsetting Tariff Effects (%) 
 
Source: the author’s simulation results. 
Since conventional approaches cannot eliminate tariff burdens, for MNEs using China to 
assemble products catering the US market, one feasible option is to shift part of their value 
chains out of China.  Now 250 billion worth of Chinese goods is subject to 25% tariff. If the 
trade war continues to escalate, the rest of Chinese exports to the US, valued at $300 billion, 
will be subject to a 15% or even higher tariff in the foreseeable future. To cope with the tariff 
burden and prepare for related uncertainty, some of GVC lead firms have relocated their 
production facilities out of China or search for alternative sourcing partners and/or contract 
manufacturers in third countries, thus reshaping the China-centered GVCs geographically.  
Chinese contract manufacturers are facing the risk of being replaced by suppliers from other 
countries. Many buyer-driven GVCs rely on China as a source of products. For example, 
Walmart imports some $50 billion in goods from China annually, about one tenth of total US 
imports from China. Walmart has 60,000 suppliers in China; H&M has about 800 there; and 
more than 90% of UNIQUE suppliers are located there. These lead firms purchase mainly 
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29.4
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labour-intensive products from Chinese suppliers. It is relatively easy for them to find 
alternative suppliers in other developing countries such as Vietnam, Bangladesh and Indonesia. 
Given the asymmetric power between lead firms and Chinese suppliers, the latter have little 
leverage to resist the re-organization of value chains. The further escalation of the trade war 
will not only undermine China’s exports to the US, but more important, it will permanently 
undercut China’s export capacity.  
In a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in China (2019), approximately 40.7% of 
respondents reported that they are considering relocating, or have relocated, their 
manufacturing facilities outside China. For those that are moving manufacturing out of China, 
Southeast Asia (24.7%) and Mexico (10.5%) are the top destinations. The slogan, “Designed 
in California by Apple, Assembled in China” is printed on the back of all Apple products, but 
the trade war has also prompted Apple to consider restructuring its China-centered value chains. 
Apple has asked its major suppliers to evaluate the cost implications of shifting 15-30% of their 
production capacity from China to Southeast Asia (Li and Cheng, 2019).  
Such relocation is not limited to American companies. Many Japanese companies have sped 
up their China exit in anticipation of further escalation of the trade war. Nintendo, which has 
most of its Switch games assembled in China, has started moving production to Vietnam; Sharp 
is considering relocating production of its Dynabook laptops to Vietnam or Taiwan; and Ricoh 
has shifted production of US-bound multifunction printers from China to Thailand (Sese, 2019). 
Unambigously the trade war is reshaping China-centered value chains. The redeployment of 
the China-centered GVCs will permanently damage China’s export capacity and China will no 
longer play a central role in the GVCs targeting the US market.    
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Chinese companies involved in the value chain of the iPhone have climbed to the upper rungs 
of the ladder.  Even companies that started as simple assemblers have not been trapped in low 
value added tasks. The analysis on the iPhone X presented here shows that, besides assembly, 
Chinese firms performed relatively sophisticated technological tasks and captured 25% of the 
value added according to the bill of materials, much higher than the 3.6% gained from assembly 
of the first generation of the iPhone. In terms of gross value, one iPhone X imported by the US 
results in a $332.75 trade deficit for the US. On the other hand, measured in value added, the 
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deficit is only $104. Under current trade statistics practice, the iPhone remains a significant 
source of statistical distortion in calculations of the Sino-US bilateral trade imbalance. 
To a certain extent, the depreciation of the yuan can alleviate the tariff burden of American 
companies importing “Made in China” products. However, the impact of yuan depreciation is 
very limited because of the foreign value added embedded in Chinese exports to the US, 33.9% 
on average. To completely offset the negative impact of a 25% tariff imposed on all Chinese 
exports to the US, the yuan should depreciate against the US dollar by 43.3% on average. Our 
simulation also suggests that, to fully compensate for a 25% tariff burden on the iPhone X, a 
400% depreciation of the yuan is needed. Hence, hedging the risk of the punitive tariffs 
imposed by the Trump administration by depreciating the yuan is mission impossible.  
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